An improvement to the so-called visual verification approach is presented. Visual verification is a method for checking the correctness of the behaviour of a reactive or concurrent system. It shares a great deal of common ground with ordinary formal state space verification, but is more user-friendly. This is because the user does not need to specify in detail the properties that the system must satisfy to be correct. Instead, the user only lists the atomic actions that are relevant for the property. Computer tools are used to obtain a graphical representation which is a summary of all possible alternative behaviours of the system, and the user then analyses the result. The improvement presented in this article allows the user to pick a region of the graphical representation and investigate it in more detail, without being overwhelmed by the details outside the region. The improvement is illustrated by analysing the livelocks in a model of the alternating bit protocol.
Introduction
In order to improve the quality of concurrent and reactive systems, in particular for safety-critical applications, several formal verification methods have been developed for ensuring the correctness of the behaviour of the system. Formal verification consists of checking that a formal model of the system satisfies a formal requirement specification according to some mathematically defined notion of "to satisfy".
Because checking satisfaction is mathematically challenging and therefore a significant burden for the system designer, verification researchers have tried to automate it as much as possible. Unfortunately, verification is demanding also computationally. Fortunately, with a number of ingenious techniques the researchers have been able to develop verification algorithms and tools that are capable of handling many verification tasks of practical significance. (An extensive survey of formal verification, its fundamental performance problem and enhanced verification algorithms is presented in [12] .)
With an automated verification method, it suffices that the system developer submits a formal model of the system and the requirement specification. However, in many cases it is very difficult to present a comprehensive requirement specification. A great difficulty here is that one should be able to think a priori of all possible things that the system might do wrong. This means that it is difficult to determine beforehand all the requirements that should be made. On the other hand, if an important requirement is accidentally forgotten, then a badly incorrect system may pass formal verification.
These problems with requirement specifications led to the development of an alternative approach called visual verification [16] . Visual verification is based on certain theories and algorithms originally developed for ordinary verification, namely the Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP) [5, 11] and its descendant Chaos-Free Failures Divergences (CFFD) Semantics [17] , but these are applied in a slightly different way.
In visual verification, to check a behavioural property of the system, the property needs not be specified in detail -it suffices that the actions (that is, operations, or execution steps) of the system that are relevant for the property are pointed out. The chosen actions are called visible actions. Then computer tools produce a graphical representation of the behaviour of the system abstracted such that only the visible actions, their relations to each other, and some information for detecting deadlocks and livelocks are shown. It is important to notice that the representation does not describe just one execution of the system, but all alternative executions simultaneously, although with a great deal of detail left out. The user analyses this representation against the expectations that the user has regarding the behaviour of the system.
In our experience, behavioural properties are often easy to check in this way without the burden of specifying the property formally beforehand. What is more, an attempt to fully understand the graphical representation sometimes reveals an error against a necessary correctness property that the user did not even think of, and would thus not have included in the requirement specification. Section 4.2 contains an example of this.
Therefore, although visual verification is perhaps not verification in the strictest sense of the word, in practice it very often produces results that are at least as reliable and sometimes more reliable than with ordinary verification. Examples of the use of visual verification in the development of communication protocols have been given in [7, 13, 8] .
An example of a different kind of visualisation in verification is given in [3] . There, telephone services are specified with graphical diagrams. A model checker is used to find violations of constraints in these diagrams, and the relevant parts of the violating paths are shown to the user.
Nothing in this world is perfect. The main drawback of visual verifica-tion -in addition to the performance problems that hamper all automatic verification -is that unless the number of the visible actions is kept small, the graphical representation of the behaviour becomes too big for the user to comprehend. As was pointed out in [16] , the size of the graphical representation depends crucially on the chosen semantics. The CFFD semantics is optimal (in a certain well-defined sense) for analysing livelocks, deadlocks and illegal sequences of visible actions. This has contributed to the fact that we have been able to apply visual verification to interesting tasks, as discussed above. However, the need for methods of obtaining more useful information with smaller graphical representations is still obvious. In this article we develop one such method: context-sensitively visible actions. Our new method is applicable in a situation where the user has detected something strange in the behaviour, and wants to investigate the peculiar part in more detail. More details can be obtained by declaring more actions visible, but then the graphical representation easily grows too big. Context-sensitive visibility makes it possible to declare that an action is visible in the peculiar part and nowhere else. ("Nowhere else" is not precisely true here, but this issue can be clarified only after presenting the theory.) In this way the user can investigate the peculiar part in great detail without being overwhelmed by the details of uninteresting parts of the behaviour of the system.
In Section 2 we recall the background theory underlying this article. Section 3 introduces visual verification and illustrates it with the aid of an example. Use of our new method is illustrated in Section 4, and its theory and implementation are discussed in Section 5.
Background Theory

Labelled transition system
A labelled transition system (LTS ) is a state-machine-like representation of the behaviour of a system or its component process. The system interacts with its environment by executing visible actions. The system may also execute invisible actions that the environment cannot directly observe. The symbol "τ " has been reserved to denote all invisible actions. Definition 2.1 A labelled transition system is a quadruple (S, Σ, ∆,ŝ), where
• S is the set of states,
• Σ is the alphabet, that is, the set of the visible actions; it is assumed that τ / ∈ Σ,
• ∆ ⊆ S × (Σ ∪ {τ }) × S is the set of transitions, and
If L is an LTS, then its components are denoted with
Example 2.2 Figure 1 shows four LTSs, Sender, Receiver, Data channel, and Ack channel. Together these LTSs comprise a model of the well-known alternating bit protocol of [4] . The purpose of the protocol is to implement a reliable data transmission link given unreliable channels. Our model covers only the logic of the protocol, and omits the payload data that is transported. The LTSs Sender and Receiver model the actual protocol, and the other two LTSs model the channels. Sender first receives a sending request from the customer by executing a send-transition. Then it sends a data message augmented with the bit "0" (sd 0 ) to Receiver through Data channel, and starts to wait for an acknowledgement (ra 0 ). After receiving the acknowledgement, Sender is ready for the transmission of the next data message, this time using "1" as the value of the alternating bit. If the acknowledgement does not arrive or arrives too slowly, Sender makes a timeout with the invisible τ -transition, and sends sd 0 another time. Sender may send sd 0 even a third time and, indeed, any number of times.
Receiver declares new messages with rec and sends an acknowledgement for all messages. The channel processes Data channel and Ack channel take a message and then either deliver it to the other side, or dispose of the message via the action lose d or lose a. 2
LTS operators
LTSs may be composed together to construct subsystems and systems. The most important operators for this are parallel composition " " and hiding.
(For more operators, see e.g. [2, 5, 11, 17] .)
. . ,ŝ n ), and S and ∆ are defined as the smallest sets such that the following hold.
• Each s ∈ S is an n-tuple s = (s 1 , . . . , s n ) such that
•ŝ ∈ S.
• Let (s 1 , . . . , s n ) ∈ S. If and only if either · a = τ and ∃i, Fig. 2 . Subprocesses of the alternating bit protocol and their common actions.
In less formal terms, visible transitions synchronise as determined by the alphabets of the components, and invisible transitions are always executed by one component at a time.
In other words, hide just changes to τ the labels of any transitions labelled with an element of A. For simplicity, if A = {a 1 , . . . , a n }, we allow writing hide a 1 , . . . , a n in L instead of hide {a 1 , . . . , a n } in L. 
We will need later in this article also the less common multiple renaming
Here, L is an LTS, a ∈ Σ L , and A is just any nonempty set of visible action names. The operator replaces each a-transition with |A| alternative transitions, one for each member of A. The alphabet is changed accordingly. It is a special case of a more general multiple renaming operator
has been discussed at least in [15] .
Strong Bisimilarity
For technical reasons the well-known notion of strong bisimilarity [10] will be needed.
have the same alphabet are (strongly) bisimilar, denoted in this article by L 1 ≃ sb L 2 , if and only if there is a relation "∼" ⊆ S 1 × S 2 such that the following hold for every s 1 , s
, and a ∈ Σ ∪ {τ }:
(ii) If s 1 ∼ s 2 and (s 1 , a, s
The relation "∼" is called strong bisimulation.
CFFD-Semantics
The notation s −a 1 a 2 · · · a n → s ′ means that the system has a finite execution (that is, a path in the LTS) that starts at s and leads to s ′ such that the sequence of the labels of the transitions along the path is precisely a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n . If we want to say that there is some s ′ such that s −a 1 a 2 · · · a n → s ′ but we do not want to specify any such s ′ , we write s −a 1 a 2 · · · a n → . The existence of an infinite execution from s with the infinite sequence a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , . . . of transition labels is denoted with s −a 1 a 2 a 3 · · ·→ . For instance, Data channel has the infinite executionŝ Data channel −sd 0 rd 0 sd 1 lose d sd 0 · · ·→ .
If a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n are visible actions, the notation s =a 1 a 2 · · · a n ⇒ s ′ means that there are m ≥ n and
′ and the result of removing all τ s from b 1 b 2 · · · b m is a 1 a 2 · · · a n . The notations s =a 1 a 2 · · · a n ⇒ and s =a 1 a 2 a 3 · · ·⇒ are defined in an analogous way. We say that a 1 a 2 · · · a n is a trace of the system if and only ifŝ =a 1 a 2 · · · a n ⇒ , and a 1 a 2 a 3 · · · is an infinite trace if and only ifŝ =a 1 a 2 a 3 · · ·⇒ .
We define a deadlock state as any state without outgoing transitions. Livelocks may be modelled with the concept of divergence. A state s is divergent, if and only if an infinite sequence of τ -transitions can be executed from it. The trace a 1 a 2 · · · a n is a divergence trace, if and only if there is a divergent state s such thatŝ =a 1 a 2 · · · a n ⇒ s.
Analogously, we could define deadlock traces as those traces that can lead to a deadlock state. However, we want our equivalences to be congruences, which means that a system is guaranteed to remain equivalent when any of its components is replaced with an equivalent component. The deadlock traces do not induce a congruence with respect to the parallel composition operator, and therefore we need the more general notion of stable failures. A stable failure is a pair (a 1 a 2 · · · a n , {b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b m }) such that there is a state s such thatŝ =a 1 a 2 · · · a n ⇒ s, and s −b→ is not true for any b ∈ {b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b m , τ }.
The sets of traces, infinite traces, divergence traces and stable failures of an LTS L are denoted with Tr(L), Inftr (L), Divtr (L) and Sfail (L).
4 Two LTSs are CFFD-equivalent if and only if they have the same CFFD-semantics and the same set of visible actions.
The set Tr(L) is not included in the triple, because it can be uniquely determined from the other components due to the formula
CFFD-equivalence is a congruence with respect to parallel composition, hiding and multiple renaming. Furthermore, strong bisimilarity implies CFFDequivalence; that is,
CFFD-semantics contains enough information about the behaviour of the system for the detection of deadlocks, livelocks and illegal actions or sequences of actions, and for listing the traces after which the deadlock etc. may occur. What is more, it was shown in [6] that as long as the LTSs are finite, any semantic model that (1) contains enough information for these tasks and (2) induces a congruence with respect to the parallel composition and hiding operators, must contain at least the same information as CFFD-semantics. This means that CFFD-semantics does not contain more information than is needed. This is very important for visual verification, because it helps to keep the graphical representations small.
In the absence of livelocks, CFFD-semantics coincides with the well-known CSP-semantics of Brookes, Hoare and Roscoe [5, 11] . In the presence of livelocks, CFFD-semantics contains more information than CSP-semantics. In CSP-semantics, livelocks are considered as catastrophic modes of behaviour (and called "chaos"). Absolutely no information is preserved about the behaviour of a system that has passed through a potentially livelocking trace. This feature makes CSP-semantics less useful for the verification of a number of systems, including the one used as an example in this article.
Visual Verification
We illustrate visual verification with the aid of the alternating bit protocol that was shown in Figures 1 and 2 . As we mentioned in Section 2.2, the system as a whole is defined by the formula
where H is the set of actions that we want to consider as internal to the protocol.
ARA [14] is a tool that can be used, among other things, for computing parallel composition and hiding of LTSs, and for reducing LTSs such that Fig. 3 . The externally observable behaviour of the alternating bit protocol.
CFFD-semantics is preserved. ARA contains also a visualisation tool that can show small LTSs on a computer screen graphically in a fairly readable (albeit not always elegant) manner. When ARA was told to construct an LTS of the above model of the alternating bit protocol and then reduce and visualise it, the result was -in essence - Figure 3 . We have redrawn the figures for this article, because the output of ARA is unsuitable for printing: it relies on colours and consumes space uneconomically. We can make a number of observations from Figure 3 . First, send and rec alternate, meaning that a message cannot be delivered before a message is sent, and the protocol does not accept a new message for transmission before the previous one has been delivered. Because each state has at least one output transition, we also see that the protocol cannot deadlock.
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On the other hand, the two τ -loops in the figure imply that the protocol can livelock. Since the channels are unreliable, and Sender contains no upper limit to the number of times it tries to transmit a message if it receives no acknowledgement, it is natural to guess that the livelocks are due to systematic loss of messages in the channels. Regarding the correctness of the protocol, this explanation of the livelocks would be acceptable, because no protocol can deliver messages if the channels are totally broken. Unfortunately, we do not yet know if it is the only reason for the livelocks (or even a reason at all); perhaps there is also a genuine error that causes livelocks even when the channels work well?
We can, fortunately, check this. Each "acceptable" livelock contains infinitely many losses of messages, so livelocks should go away if we make lose d and lose a visible, that is, remove them from H. The result of doing this is shown in Figure 4 . This LTS contains no τ -loops, so the protocol does not have illegal livelocks. Figure 4 is, however, quite complicated. The reason is that now that lose d and lose a are visible, all their possible orderings relative to each other and to send and rec are shown, although we need them only where the livelocks were in the previous picture. The next section presents a new method that solves this problem. 
Use of Context-Sensitive Visibility
The basic idea of our new method is to make chosen actions visible for only a part of the behaviour of the system. The user specifies this part by choosing a set of states from the original visualised LTS, that is, the LTS where the chosen actions are hidden everywhere. An automatic tool then produces an LTS that is semantically otherwise like the original LTS, but occurrences of the chosen actions are now visible (at least) in the part that the user selected. Before we explain the theory and implementation of context-sensitive visibility in the next section, we illustrate in this section how the user sees it. Figure 5 shows the result of making lose d visible in the ordinary sense (that is, visible everywhere), and lose a visible in the end state of the rec-transition in Figure 3 . To emphasize that not all lose a-transitions are shown, those that are shown are labelled with lose a vis .
Livelocks in the Protocol
The τ -loop at the start state of the rec-transition has been replaced with a lose d-loop, so the reason for its existence indeed was an infinite number of losses of messages in Data channel. If only a finite number of messages is lost, then the system can execute lose d only a finite number of times, and it must thus eventually execute rec. The τ -loop at the end state of the rec-transition has been replaced with a loop starting with τ and ending with either lose d or lose a vis . This means that the original τ -loop had two different (although not mutually exclusive) causes: an infinite number of losses of messages in Data channel, and an infinite number of losses of messages in Ack channel.
It was thus possible -and actually quite easy -to check from Figure 5 that there are no illegal livelocks. The simplicity of Figure 5 compared to Figure 4 demonstrates the benefit of context-sensitive visibility.
That Figure 5 has essentially the same structure as Figure 3 is good luck; the method does not try to preserve the structure. The method tries to make the resulting LTS small, and it succeeded very well in this example. The user would no doubt try other combinations before deciding to make lose d visible everywhere and lose a only in the chosen state. This is not a problem since, thanks to computer tools, an unsuccessful attempt does not take much time or effort, and often gives hints for the next attempt.
Further Analysis
We note from Figure 5 that the state where the lose a vis -transition starts is actually rather curious. When the protocol is in this state, it can continue only by losing either a data message or an acknowledgement. This suggests that if the channels were made reliable by removing the lose d-transitions from Data channel and lose a-transitions from Ack channel, then the protocol could deadlock.
A more detailed analysis (performed with tools and techniques that are not a topic of the present article) shows that after executing, for example, send sd 0 rd 0 rec τ sd 0 τ sa 0 rd 0 sd 0 τ , the protocol is in a situation where each channel contains a message, and both Sender and Receiver are ready to send but not ready to receive a message. Sending is not possible, however, because the channels are already full. Thus the protocol cannot continue before a data or acknowledgement message is lost by a channel. With reliable channels it would be in a deadlock. 
Alt bit proto
Alt bit proto The above is an example of a subtle error that is easily ignored in ordinary verification. It is not apparent in Figure 3 , because the model of channels we have used until now is such that if nothing else can happen, then the channel is guaranteed to lose the message in it, and therefore no deadlock arises. On the other hand, a reliable channel does not have this nice property of losing messages when the protocol would otherwise deadlock.
In brief, our model of channels is incorrect in a way that hides an error in the protocol. Ordinary verification of properties such as "messages are not duplicated" and "if only a finite number of messages is lost, then each send is eventually followed by rec" cannot reveal the error, because the system as a whole has these properties. We found the error because Figure 5 gave us some information we did not ask for, namely that the protocol has a state where it may only execute lose d or lose a. This is an example of the ability of visual verification to point out errors whose possibility is easily ignored when writing a requirement specification.
To fix the protocol, we add transitions to Sender that consume all unexpected messages. We also change the channels such that they can commit to not lose the message. The fixed protocol is shown in Figure 6 , and its behaviour in Figure 7 . The behaviour seems correct. The τ -transitions immediately before the rec-transition might seem surprising: does not Sender keep on sending data messages until it receives an acknowledgement from Receiver, which cannot happen before the rec-transition? The answer is that yes, it tries to do that. However, if the channel decides enough many times (twice, to be precise) to deliver a message, then eventually a situation is reached where Sender cannot send any more messages because the data channel is full, while Receiver is ready for rec.
When we made the same analyses by using data and acknowledgement channels of capacity 2 in the protocol, we found that the pictures where lose a is visible everywhere, Figures 4 and 7 (a) , became more complicated, but the pictures where lose a is context-sensitively visible, Figures 5 and 7 (b) , remained the same. 6 5 Theory of Context-Sensitive Visibility
Correctness
In this section we will describe how an LTS is made where some action a is context-sensitively visible, and then formulate and prove two of its properties. The properties state that the LTS is, in a certain precise sense, "between" the LTS where a is visible everywhere, and the original LTS where a is hidden everywhere. It would suffice for our purposes to state and prove these properties in terms of CFFD-semantics. In this case, however, it is natural and easy to prove a much stronger result, namely that the properties hold also when strong bisimilarity is used in their definition. This implies immediately the corresponding results for CFFD, because strong bisimilarity implies CFFD-equivalence, as was mentioned in Section 2.4. Let us assume that we are analysing the system Sys = hide a in L, where L can be any (finite) LTS. In a typical case, as in the protocol example above, L has been constructed through parallel composition from subprocesses and, after hiding actions (other than a), reduced according to our equivalence. We would now like to make the action a visible in some states of the system. Context-sensitive visibility is based on (1) introducing two new action names a vis and a inv that are not in Σ L ; (2) constructing a special switch process W from Sys, a vis , a inv and a list of states where a should be visible; and (3) then producing the following LTS:
We will describe the actual construction of W in the next section. In this section we will formulate and prove the correctness of Csv . To do that we need to know that W has certain special properties. These properties are listed in the next definition, which says that the alphabet of W is obtained by adding a vis and a inv to the alphabet of Sys; each trace of the original LTS leads to precisely one state of W ; W does not have τ -transitions; each state has either an a vis -or an a inv -transition to itself, but not both; and there are no other a visor a inv -transitions.
Definition 5.1 Let L be an LTS with Σ L as its alphabet, and let a ∈ Σ L , but 
Furthermore, ifŝ W =σ⇒ s 1 andŝ W =σ⇒ s 2 , then s 1 = s 2 .
• ∀s ∈ S W : ¬(s −τ → )
The first correctness criterion says that if we hide again what has been made context-sensitively visible, then what we get is CFFD-equivalent to the original Sys. In fact, it is strongly bisimilar. The τ -transitions of L on either side simulate each other, and whatever else L can do, W can participate in it, either because of its a visand a inv -transitions or because of the existence of the unique states s σ for each trace σ of Sys = hide a in L. Furthermore, all transitions of W are participated by L. Thus, both processes can simulate every transition of the other process, which proves that the relation is a strong bisimulation. 2 A natural next claim could be that Csv -or a process strongly bisimilar to it -can be obtained by converting some a-transitions of L to a vis -transitions, and the remaining a-transitions to τ -transitions. This is not true, however, as the example in Figure 8 demonstrates. We want to make a visible at the middle state of Sys in Figure 8 (a) , and invisible elsewhere. However, if the first a-transition of L is converted to τ , then no state of the result can execute both b and a vis , so no state can simulate the second state of Csv in Figure 8 (c). On the other hand, if the first a-transition is converted to a vis , then the result cannot simulate the initial τ -transition of Csv .
What is true, however, is that there is an LTS that is strongly bisimilar to L, and from which Csv can be obtained by renaming and hiding a-transitions.
• Csv can be obtained from L ′ by hiding some a-transitions, and renaming the remaining a-transitions to a vis .
• L ′ ≃ sb L Proof. The first claim follows directly from the definitions, if we hide those a-transitions that were created from a inv -transitions with the "[{a}/a inv ]"-operator, and rename the remaining a-transitions to a vis . A proof of the second claim is obtained from the proof of Theorem 5.2 by replacing L ′ and L for Sys ′ and Sys, respectively, and making trivial changes to the formulae giving the alphabets and to the labels of transitions that originate from a-transitions of L. 2
Constructing the Switch
Let S vis ⊆ S Sys be the set of the states of Sys where the user wanted a to be visible. For every σ ∈ Σ * Sys let s σ = {s ∈ S Sys |ŝ Sys =σ⇒ s}. Intuitively, the switch W is obtained from Sys by converting it to a deterministic LTS, and adding to each state an a vis -or a inv -loop depending on whether the user wanted a to be visible in any original state contained in the deterministic state. The idea of the loops is that while the switch process remains in this state, it allows the target process to execute freely the chosen action but blocks it from executing the alternative action. Formally, the switch W is the following LTS:
• S W = { s σ | σ ∈ Tr(Sys) } Sys is made deterministic with the well-known subset construction that can be found in any textbook on finite automata or compilers, for example [9, 1] . It is important to notice that despite the subset construction this operation is not costly, because we are not using the complete state space of the system but the abstracted, reduced version that in any case has to be small enough for visual verification.
It is possible that s σ contains a state from S vis and another state from outside S vis . In that case, W may make a visible even if Sys is in a state where the user did not request a to be visible. The visibility of a depends only on the trace executed by Sys so far. This is the sense mentioned in the introduction in which our new method may show more than the user asked for. The user can never lose any information, but the final LTS can become larger than would be absolutely necessary.
The switch used in the protocol example is shown in Figure 9 .
Conclusions
We presented a method for making an action visible in some parts of an LTS and invisible in other parts. The method is based on duplicating the action in question into a visible and invisible version, and constructing a special switch process that chooses which version of the action may occur. The invisible version is then hidden, and the visible version is shown.
As the example in this paper demonstrates, context-sensitive visibility can improve visual verification. It reduces the size of the LTS that is shown, while still providing the information that the user wanted.
The implementation of context-sensitive visibility is not at all difficult. Multiple renaming and the adding of self-loop transitions are straightforward operations, and hiding, parallel composition and determinisation already exist in many LTS manipulation tools, including ARA. The method is also computationally cheap, because it is performed on an abstracted, reduced version of the system instead of the complete state space.
The method can perhaps be improved by minimising the switch before use. This issue is not trivial, however, because the last two conditions of Definition 5.1 are not preserved by strong bisimilarity. Another hypothesis is that the method can be used to make several actions context-sensitively visible simultaneously. We plan to investigate these hypotheses in the future.
